. This risks divorcing the decision to vote from the
Students of rational choice theory are well aware of its historic inability to give a satisfactory account of even minimal participation in elections by rational, self-interested actors. This problem has been identified as the &dquo;paradox of voting&dquo; (Mueller 1989) . The original calculus of voting, first developed by Downs (1957) and further elaborated by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) , expresses the rewards for voting (R) as: R = BP -C, where B is the difference in utility (or benefits) an individual expects to receive if the preferred candidate defeats opponents with different characteristics; P is the probability that the individual will, by voting, bring about the victory of the preferred candidate; and C is the cost to the individual of the act of voting. Because the probability term is extremely small in most cases, the model predicts abstention. Obviously, such a prediction is problematic because large numbers of citizens do vote. The paradox was clear to Downs, and to Riker and Ordeshook, who attempted to reconcile rational assumptions and real behavior by incorporating into the original calculus consumption benefits, or utility derived from the act of voting itself. The decision to vote thus became expressed as: R = BP -C + D, with D representing such psychic goods as helping save democracy, fulfilling a sense of civic duty, expressing one's efficacy, and so on (Riker and Ordeshook 1968: 28) . But (Strom 1975: 909 The minimax regret model has also been criticized for being extremely conservative and for leading &dquo;to rather bizarre behavior when applied to other decisions or even when extended within the voting context&dquo; (Mueller 1989; 353 (Beck 1975; Stephens 1975 (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1975: 922). The Pammett 1991: 40) . This is partly because the response rate was very high and partly because the incentive to misreport is smaller in a self-administered questionnaire than in an interview (see Sudman and Bradburn 1987: 277; Dillman 1978: 62-63 Respondents could choose among eight possibilities, ranging from 1 chance in 10 to 1 chance in 100,000,000. The variable was transformed to a 0 to 1 scale, &dquo;1 chance in 10&dquo; being given the score of 1 and &dquo;1 chance in 100,000,000&dquo; being given the score of 0.
